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Abstract Gordon Tullock is one of the most important of the founders and contributors to
Public Choice. Two innovations are typical “Tullock Challenges.” The first relates to method:
the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social
networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to
strong incentives by governments to manipulate the policy outcomes. In general, “What is
important will be manipulated by the government.” To restrain government manipulation,
one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular
participation and federalism or introduce random mechanisms.
Keywords Happiness · Social networks · Constitutional economics · Random
mechanisms · Public choice
JEL Classification D72 · H10 · I31 · P16 · D02
Without doubt, Gordon Tullock is one of the most vibrant and important of the founders and
contributors to Public Choice. Everybody who has ever met him has to have been impressed
by his gift to immediately engage everyone into high-level scholarly arguments, which, in
most if not all cases, the other person lost. Almost always, Gordon Tullock proposes a totally
unconventional idea followed by an equally wild policy suggestion. He is a real “innovative
skeptic” who comes up with “uncommon solutions.”
When I first met Gordon, he immediately criticized me for my totally naïve view of
the population’s influence on politics. In particular, he claimed that there has never been a
revolution successfully achieved by citizens alone.1 This was news to me as I am one of
those romantic people who believe in revolutions from below.
1See Tullock (1971, 1974, 1987). Public Choice contributions influenced by Tullock’s lead are, for example,
Bernholz (1991, 1997), Wintrobe (1998), and Kurrild-Klitgaard (2000).
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Knowing that I am from Switzerland, Gordon immediately suggested that I should de-
velop a better political system than democracy, a suggestion that totally flabbergasted me.
Like most people, I consider democracy, in particular direct democracy, to be a sanctified
institution, and I have no clue how to improve on it.
I greatly enjoyed my interactions with Gordon as they motivated me to think hard about
these challenges; however, I must confess that I am far from Gordon’s originality in sug-
gesting solutions. As I greatly admire Gordon, it is a great honor for me to have been chosen
by the Board of the European Public Choice Society to present the First Tullock Lecture.
I call my subject “Tullock Challenges”—and it encompasses those open issues identified
by the kind of thinking that Gordon represents. I chose two innovations, which as far as
I am aware Gordon did not deal with because they are quite recent. The first innovation
is one of method: It has become possible to measure subjective well-being, or happiness.
It is one of the noteworthy results of modern happiness research to demonstrate that such
measurements make sense and are reliable. The possibility of measuring happiness has had
important policy consequences; for example, countries like France and the United Kingdom
now engage in policies designed to maximize happiness.
The second innovation is the emergence of digital social networks such as Facebook,
Twitter, to some extent Google, and other Internet platforms. The policy consequences may
be that revolutions from below appear to be possible now. Examples from Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, as well as other Arabic countries and beyond may be pointing in this direction.
The challenge is to understand the consequences that these two innovations have for so-
ciety and how political measures can make them beneficial for the people. Although the two
innovations are on a quite different level, there is nevertheless a common theme. My argu-
ment is that both innovations lead to strong incentives by governments to influence policy
outcomes. The manipulation principle proposes: “What is important will be manipulated by
the government.” Thus, I claim that governments will manipulate the happiness indicators
and the digital social networks in their favor. This is a generalization of the well-known
result from Social Choice Theory that all democratic preference aggregations can be manip-
ulated.
Section 1 discusses the effect on politics of the innovation of measuring happiness, and
Sect. 2 addresses the innovation of digital social networks. Section 3 looks at what can be
done to mitigate or prevent manipulation by governments while helping to fulfill individual
preferences. I argue that we have to turn to Constitutional Economics and do two things: ex-
pand the possibilities for direct popular participation and introduce random decision-making
mechanisms.2 Section 4 closes by considering what Gordon Tullock has taught us with re-
spect to these issues.
1 The happiness innovation
1.1 Measuring subjective well-being
Human beings want to be happy: This is the view that most philosophers share. In par-
ticular, Aristotle stressed that happiness is a desirable goal of most people in all periods.
The innovation thus does not relate to happiness as such but to the possibility of measur-
2This is, of course, another major contribution by Gordon; see the major influence of Buchanan and Tullock’s
(1962) book.
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ing it in a reliable way. Economists have traditionally assumed that utility cannot be mea-
sured; therefore, microeconomics was developed without the need to measure it. Instead,
the assumption is that individuals maximize their utility subject to constraints, which yields
empirically testable propositions. In contrast, psychologists have measured happiness for
a considerable number of years by carefully administered representative surveys. Only re-
cently,3 economists have noted this innovation and have started to use the corresponding
data.4 These data are of good quality and can be used for serious econometric estimates.
In particular, measured subjective happiness correlates highly and robustly with objectively
measurable aspects that most people associate with “true” happiness, such as that happy
people smile more (captured by the inimitable so-called “Duchenne smile”), initiate more
social interactions, are more energetic, flexible, creative and optimistic, and are less prone
to commit suicide.
Most studies in economics use “life satisfaction” based on carefully administered repre-
sentative surveys that capture a longer-run and cognitive self-evaluation of subjective well-
being.5 In contrast, “happiness” relates to a short-run, affective mode. However, in line with
much of the scholarly literature, I use the terms “happiness” and “life satisfaction” inter-
changeably as long as no confusion arises.
Today, happiness research has become a thriving field.6 Interdisciplinarity is one of its
major characteristics. In addition to psychologists and now economists, there are political
scientists and sociologists involved in the field. The techniques of analysis are quite simi-
lar so that there is more extensive cross-fertilization than in most other areas of scientific
inquiry.
1.2 Determinants of happiness
Some of the most important determinants of happiness are also relevant for policymaking.
These factors refer to the contemporaneous estimates, and they are similar for a large number
of countries, quite irrespective of their income levels. The results listed are partial effects
keeping all other influences constant.
Economic determinants:
• Higher income clearly produces more happiness.7
• The unemployed are much less happy than are those having a job.
• The self-employed are happier than those working as employees despite the fact that they
tend to work longer hours, carry more risk, and often earn less.
• Giving and voluntary work raise the happiness of those engaged in these activities.
3A forerunner is Easterlin (1974).
4Examples are the General Social Survey, the European Social Survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel,
the British Household Panel, the World Value Survey, or the World Gallup Poll.
5Representative surveys are only one technique for measuring subjective well-being. Other techniques are, for
example, the Experience Sampling Method, the Day Reconstruction Method, the U-Index, or brain scanning.
6See, for example, the survey articles by Oswald (1997), Frey and Stutzer (2002a), Dolan et al. (2008) and the
monographs by Kahneman et al. (1999), Frey and Stutzer (2002b), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004),
Layard (2005), and Frey (2008).
7Moreover, most studies find a strongly diminishing marginal effect, but Cullis et al. (2011a, 2011b) find a
linear relationship at least for European countries.
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Social determinants:
• Religious persons are happier than those who do not believe in God or in some higher
power and who do not attend religious ceremonies.
• Those with a close-knit family are happier than those without.
• Personal relationships such as having friends and entertaining many social contacts raise
happiness.
Political determinants:
• People are happier in democratic polities; they value the political participation possibil-
ities in a constitutionally guaranteed process above and beyond the outcomes (they reap
procedural utility).
• The more decentralized the political decisions, that is, the closer they are to the citizens
the happier people are.
• “Good government” contributes to happiness.
Psychological effects:
• Human beings evaluate their own happiness level relative to other persons. They compare
themselves to reference groups endogenously chosen. In particular, when individuals ex-
perience higher income, they compare themselves to other persons whose income also
might have risen.
• People adapt to new circumstances. In the extreme, this leads to the “Easterlin Paradox,”
which suggests that economic growth does not raise happiness as people continually and
fully adjust their expectations upwards.
1.3 Policy conclusions
Based on the insights from happiness research, not only do a number of prominent schol-
ars, such as Robert Frank, Richard Layard, Ruut Veenoven, or Andrew Oswald,8 but also
politicians, such as French President Sarkozy (see Stiglitz et al. 2009), British Prime Minis-
ter David Cameron, as well as the People’s Republic of China, conclude that governments
should use these results to “maximize happiness.” Even earlier, the Kingdom of Bhutan de-
cided to maximize Gross National Happiness instead of Gross National Product (see Ura
and Galay 2004).
A number of concrete policies have been suggested, but it suffices here to mention two
of them to capture their gist.
• Due to the insight of happiness research that individuals tend to compare themselves to
others, those who experience an income increase impose a negative external effect on
other persons. This produces a rat race where no one is better off despite investing much
effort in “keeping up with the Joneses.” Scholars such as Frank (1999) and Layard (2007)
propose to (heavily) tax these external effects by equalizing incomes.
• Unemployed persons are much less happy than employed ones, but this effect is miti-
gated when the unemployed live in areas where many other persons are unemployed.9
The unemployed compare their fates with other persons, and, when many others are also
unemployed, they feel somewhat less unhappy. It follows that policy makers should be
less bothered by the pockets of high unemployment as people there are less unhappy than
those in areas with little unemployment.
8For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), Veenhoven (2010), and, in general, De Prycker (2010: 587).
9See, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Di Tella et al. (2003), and Clark (2003).
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1.4 Arguments against the government maximizing happiness
There are various arguments why governments should not pursue the goal of maximizing
an index representing people’s happiness. They have been expounded in Frey and Stutzer
(2010) and need not be repeated here. In the context of the Tullock Challenges, the major
counterargument against the government maximizing happiness is that it will manipulate the
happiness index.
Proposition 1 As soon as the happiness index has become an official goal of government
policy, the government will manipulate it.
Such behavior is not surprising—at least to a political economist—nevertheless, it has
largely been ignored when it comes to government policy. In the social sciences, there
is a similar idea known as Campbell’s Law (1976), which states that the more inten-
sively a quantitative indicator is used for policy purposes the more it is subject to dis-
torting and biasing social processes. In economic theory, Goodhart’s Law (1975) points
out the informational aspect. It suggests that once an economic indicator, in particular
the stock of money, becomes an economic policy target it loses the information content
that would qualify it to play such a role. The Lucas Critique (1976) states that the struc-
ture of an econometric system tends to break down when policy interventions are under-
taken. Power (1997), Strathern (2000), and Frey and Osterloh (2010) analyzed the reac-
tivity of persons when they were subjected to audits, rankings, and other assessments.
Jacob and Levitt (2003) showed that schools subject to standardized tests gave them in-
centives to cheat, such as “teaching to the test,” excluding weak students from attending
school when the test was to take place, or excluding the weak students from the school
altogether. Espeland and Sauder (2007) empirically studied the response of American busi-
ness schools to their rankings, thus undermining their usefulness. All this reminds us of the
fundamental problem in preference aggregation that all democratic voting schemes that pur-
port to choose a winner from at least three candidates can be manipulated (Gibbard 1973;
Satterthwaite 1975; for a recent account, Szpiro 2010). However, in contrast to the above
proposition, social choice theory does not focus on a particular actor’s incentive to manipu-
late.
Governments for a long time have influenced aggregate policy indicators or used “cre-
ative accounting” (e.g., De la Torre 2009) in their favor (see, e.g., the empirical evidence
provided by Von Hagen and Wolff 2006; Dafflon and Rossi 1999; and Forte 2001). Many
different governments have manipulated GNP numbers by introducing parts of the shadow
economy into the official measure or by just assuming particular changes in the productivity
of the public sector. Most governments have manipulated the published rate of unemploy-
ment by resorting to updated definitions or simply by removing people from the pool of
unemployed (e.g., Gregg 1994; Webster 2002). During the recent Euro-crisis, several gov-
ernments demonstrated how easy it was to manipulate budget deficits and the size of the
public debt (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti 2003).
The possibility of manipulating the happiness index is considerably greater when looking
at government indicators than public sector indicators because the basis of the government
index is representative surveys of subjective evaluations. It is quite easy to distort the repre-
sentativeness in favor of the government, for example, by excluding unhappy persons who
are difficult to reach (such as the homeless). The government can manipulate the index by
excluding or including persons staying in the country only for a limited period, those consid-
ered mentally ill, or those incarcerated. Another possibility for manipulating the happiness
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indicator is by choosing a regional representation of surveys, giving more weight to regions
more supportive of the government. The government also can exclude outliers, for example,
persons stating that their life satisfaction is abysmally low by arguing that their answers are
not to be taken seriously. In fact, governments may be expected to exhibit a great deal of
ingenuity in manipulating the happiness indicator in their favor.
Even if for some reason it was not possible or suitable to manipulate the existing hap-
piness index, governments have a way out. They can introduce a new happiness indicator
claiming that it captures the relevant or “true” happiness of the population in a better way.
In actuality, they would introduce it because it is more favorable to the politicians in power.
For instance, the government can construct a new happiness indicator that gives less weight
to fewer unhappy people due to their low incomes, unfortunate life experiences, or living in
disadvantaged regions. This raises the “official” happiness score to benefit the politicians in
power—at least as long as the population can be fooled.
1.5 Consequences
What is important will be manipulated; this is the manipulation principle. Politicians pursu-
ing their own goals of personal power, recognition, ideology, and income and who seek to
stay in government have a strong incentive to manipulate the happiness index that they claim
to maximize. The result is a policy that does not correspond to the preferences of the popula-
tion. Rather, it leads to a systematic deviation from this democratic goal and obfuscates the
performance of government. I therefore conclude that governments should not maximize
happiness. In Sect. 3, I try to indicate in what ways governments can use the insights of
happiness research to improve the lot of the population.
2 Digital innovations and revolutions
2.1 Digital social networks
Over the last years, surveillance by closed-circuit television has expanded rapidly. In some
countries, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, many people are continually being moni-
tored. Google’s “street view” goes in the same direction. This raises a government’s ability
to control its population and to prevent any signs of discontent with its policies.
In contrast, Internet forums or digital social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and
to some extent Google, as well as Wikileaks,10 often are claimed to be “democratic in-
struments,”11 which help citizens to regain their position vis-à-vis government. The digital
social networks facilitate an exchange of views between a wide set of persons at very low
or no entry cost and are open to anyone. It seems to be close to the philosophical idea of an
unconstrained discourse (Habermas 1996). This democratic function has become visible in
the revolutions recently taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the antigovernment
demonstrations in several other countries including Iran, Syria, and the People’s Republic
of China (see, e.g., Sreberny and Kiabarny 2010).
10Internet social networks are discussed, for example, in Watts (1999), Wellmann (1999, 2001), Bell and
Kennedy (2000), or Castells (2010).
11For example, by the U.S. government. See Economist, 2011, January 8: 74-75. Scholarly discussions of
Internet politics are provided by Chadwick (2006) and Chadwick and Howard (2009).
Public Choice (2011) 148:269–281 275
2.2 Government manipulations
Digital social networks are an innovation that not only serves individuals who want to ex-
press and discuss their opinions but also presents new opportunities for the politicians in
power to manipulate information and to control the population.12
Proposition 2 Governments have an incentive to manipulate digital social networks in their
favor.
There are four major avenues for governments to exploit the Internet’s innovations to
further their own goals (see also Morozov 2010):
(1) Persons active on the Internet not only interact with other users but also can be identified
by the police and secret service. Consequently, the use of these platforms is dangerous.
(2) Independent suppliers of Internet information such as Wikileaks can be haunted, perse-
cuted, and silenced, and Internet providers not conforming to the wishes of the govern-
ment can be shut down (see Economist, 2011, February 12).
(3) Governments can capture the Internet by employing professional pro-government blog-
gers. As a result, digital social networks are undermined.
(4) Finally, governments can use the possibilities provided by the Internet to divert atten-
tion from politics. It can provide attractive films, video clips, sporting events, celebrity
news, or pornography shows so that the incentive to demonstrate or revolt is decreased
or vanishes altogether. There is concrete evidence from the former German Democratic
Republic (Kern and Hainmueller 2009) that such “opium for the masses” may indeed
work. At one point in time, parts of that country were able to receive TV channels from
West Germany, whereas other parts did not and could only consume the incessant and
boring propaganda from the communist rulers. One would expect that those who could
see the much higher living standard and freedom in the West every evening would be
more opposed to the GDR government. In fact, the opposite was true. East Germans
exposed to West German TV were more satisfied with life in East Germany (e.g., they
made fewer applications for exit visas). This seemingly paradoxical result can be at-
tributed to TV being primarily a source of entertainment based mainly on the presen-
tation of luxury, celebrities, and erotic scenes. Television viewers did not threaten the
communist government because they were too much occupied vicariously consuming
the Western life style.
This case suggests that governments may actively use digital platforms to provide enter-
tainment and to dampen political unrest. The idea that “no dictator in the world can stop
Facebook” (a recent title in a German newspaper) is naïve—and Gordon Tullock would
certainly be one of the first to agree with that verdict. Governments have indeed a strong
incentive to manipulate Internet innovations.
It could be argued that the recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya indicate that the
existing digital social networks helped to topple dictatorial governments, which may be true
but also might be the exception rather than the rule. The means of Internet communica-
tion are relatively recent innovations, and the respective Arab governments therefore were
not sufficiently prepared to counter the danger. It also may be argued that these dictator-
ships were technically and mentally incapable of meeting this challenge. It must, however,
12Governments have a long history of manipulating the population, for example by the “panem et circenses”
policy in ancient Rome.
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be assumed that other authoritarian governments will quickly learn once they realize how
dangerous digital social networks can become to them. Moreover, it is not clear whether rev-
olutions based on digital networks are really effective. The activity induced takes place at an
individualistic level and reflects “flash campaigns” devoted to ever-new issues. In contrast,
the establishment of a new, more democratic, government must be based on a dependable
and stable constitutional framework.
2.3 New digital equilibrium
Internet forums are an innovation that is raising the possibility of individuals expressing their
political preferences and of governments counteracting and influencing those preferences. It
is therefore mistaken to assume that this innovation is a unique force furthering revolutions
from below. Gordon Tullock’s skepticism with such “romantic” views holds also in the age
of digital social networks. Public Choice scholars have the task of analyzing the determi-
nants of the new equilibrium driven by the digital innovation. The conditions under which
the innovation can be exploited by individuals and politicians in power need to be carefully
identified. This presents a major challenge.
3 How to restrain government manipulation
3.1 Independent bodies
The innovations produced by the ability to measure happiness and to engage in digital so-
cial networks enlarge governments’ scope for manipulating individual preferences. The only
way to check this incentive is to change the rules of the game. One possibility is to establish
independent political bodies (see Eichenberger and Schelker 2006). The idea of a judicial
branch that is independent from the government is part of the classical division of power.
More recently, central banks have been given a status of independence vis-à-vis the gov-
ernment. To prevent the manipulation of the happiness index (as well as of other macroe-
conomic indicators), one might establish an independent statistical office. To prevent the
manipulation of digital social networks, one might establish an independent telecommuni-
cations agency.
It is doubtful whether bodies can be constructed that are really independent of the govern-
ment, in particular in countries without such traditions. This even applies for central banks.
There are only very few in the world that cannot be forced by the politicians in power to
follow their wishes and orders. Governments often manipulate formally independent central
banks. Even if the independent bodies are able to maintain their discretion with respect to
the tasks assigned to them, governments find it easy to circumvent them. A statistical office
in charge of the happiness index would find it difficult to prevent the government from in-
troducing a new, more favorable index. A telecommunications agency could hardly prevent
the government from interfering in new ways with digital social networks. It is therefore
advisable to look into more fundamental constitutional rules in order to restrict govern-
mental manipulation of the population. Section 3.2 proposes stronger political participation
possibilities, and Section 3.3 a more extensive use of random selection mechanisms.
3.2 Stronger political participation possibilities
Authoritarian systems as well as representative democracies are prone to give professional
politicians extensive powers. A “political class” emerges that tends to act in its own interest
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while disregarding the wishes of the population. Empirical research in Public Choice (see, in
particular, Kirchgässner et al. 1999) has demonstrated that extending the popular participa-
tion rights of the citizens via initiatives, referendums, and recall may restrain governments
significantly. The same holds for the decentralization of political decisions in traditional fed-
eralism and newer forms (such as, e.g., Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions;
see Frey and Eichenberger 1999). These constitutional rules lead to more fully informed
and active citizens (as shown empirically by Benz and Stutzer 2004) and to more confident
citizens, who are better able to resist government manipulation.13 They are more aware of a
government’s intention to modify or exchange the happiness indicator as well as the extent
to which it interferes with the digital social networks.
3.3 Random mechanisms
The use of probabilistic elements in politics can be seen as an extension of democracy. In
contrast to a traditional definition of democracy that is focused on the right to vote, it leads
to a closer reflection of individual preferences in political bodies and decisions. It can be
considered a disregarded form of government in the tradition of Gordon Tullock.
Random selection mechanisms allow an exact representation of citizens’ preferences and
undermine the attempts of governments to manipulate their citizens. Moreover, it avoids the
growing costs of running a voting system consisting of the monetary expenditures for an
election campaign,14 as well as in the attention devoted by reigning politicians and their
contenders. Random selection may be used widely to choose the members of parliament
(either one or both chambers), the executives at the various levels of government, and the
judiciary.
Random systems are not new. Indeed, in antiquity, various city-states, in particular
Athens, employed them to prevent corruption and violence in election campaigns. In Venice,
the doges were elected by a combination of random selection and votes. In some countries,
juries are selected by lot as are the “Planungszellen” in Germany and “Citizens Juries” in
the United States and Australia. Many political bodies use the lot in order to reach a decision
when there is an equality of votes.
The idea is also rooted in democratic political theory. Aristotle in his Politeia (book 4)
even takes the choice of rulers by lot as the only democratic one; he considers elections to
necessarily be oligarchic. In Public Choice theory random referendums (Frey 1969), proba-
bilistic models in social choice (Intriligator 1973) and in models of voting by veto (Mueller
1978) have been suggested. An extreme champion of random mechanisms in politics is
Burnheim (1985) who wants to abandon elections by voting as the representation of the
will of the citizens (Rousseau 1762/1937) altogether. Burnheim discusses several possible
objections (pp. 164–179). Most of them echo those raised against direct democracy. Ran-
domly selected citizens are said to lack the competence and interest to engage in politics,
and they tend to be dominated by experts and bureaucracy. Demarchic bodies moreover are
not accountable because their members are not eligible for reappointment.15
13As Frey and Stutzer (2000) suggest, citizens in more directly democratic units are, ceteris paribus, hap-
pier, which further activates them. Note, however, the more skeptical results in Dorn et al. (2007); see also
Bjørnskov et al. (2008).
14In 2008, the elections for the U.S. president, 435 members of the House of Representatives, and 33 Senators
are estimated to have cost 5.3 billion dollars (Focus, October 30, 2008, http://www.focus.de/, accessed April
28, 2011.
15Buchstein (2009) provides a useful survey of aleatoric democracy; the relationship to anarchy is discussed
in Martin (1995-6).
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These arguments against random choice in politics are valid only partly and should be
compared to the problems of electoral democracy such as the emergence of a “class poli-
tique” pursuing its own goals instead of those of the population, or the restrictive effect of
the need for reelection to induce the politicians to act in the interest of the citizens. As has al-
ready been pointed out, in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany, election campaigns cost huge amounts of money and divert a considerable
share of the attention of politicians from problems of great importance to the population.
Elections also provide an excellent avenue for special interest groups to exert undue influ-
ence. It cannot be denied that, at least on average, randomly chosen citizens are less educated
than the average politician and perhaps are also less interested in political affairs. However,
it should not be forgotten that the politicians chosen by lot can use the advice provided
by experts and public officials; that is, they do not need to be technically competent. Their
task is to evaluate alternatives in light of their preferences and life experiences.16 If missing
competence were indeed the crucial issue, a democracy such as Switzerland that relies on
its citizens deciding all major issues by referenda would have failed long ago. The opposite
is the case.17 This suggests that the idea of random elements to reflect better the preferences
of the population should be taken more seriously than it has been.
4 What can we learn from Gordon Tullock
There are three aspects where we can profit directly from Gordon Tullock’s way of looking
at the world.
(1) “The world is changing, and politico-economic analysis should be aware of the innova-
tions occurring.” Here, I have chosen the measurement of happiness and the emergence
of digital social networks as examples.
(2) “Do not be naïve.” Innovations do provide new options to further democracy, but it
should not be overlooked that, at the same time, they offer new possibilities for gov-
ernments to manipulate the population. It has been argued here that governments are
subject to the manipulation principle and to influence the happiness index as well as
digital social networks for their benefit.
(4) “Seek new solutions.” Proposals should be made to go beyond the existing constitutional
setting. The government’s incentives to manipulate the happiness data and the digital
social networks should be restrained by extending the direct political participation rights
of the citizens. Random elements should play a larger role in the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government. These changes help citizens to be better informed
and more self-confident and should prevent the emergence of a political class serving
its own interests.
This paper has been inspired by Gordon Tullock’s example, which I am proud to follow but
incapable of matching.
16The German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger aptly quipped that professional politicians are the only
people who never did any serious work; their lives consists of sitting in meetings and giving more or less
competent talks and interviews.
17Switzerland is usually ranked second in happiness rankings (behind Denmark), has a high standard of
living, is well organized and is very attractive to immigrants.
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